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fendant at one moment claims that the bill of sale, until set aside,
is a complete bar to plaintiff's action, because it purports to convey
all of plaintiff's interest in the partnership ; and then in the next
vehemently asserts that the ventures in vouchers and whiskey were
defendant's own individual speculations.
For the reasons heretofore given there existed no necessity for
rescinding the sale, nor that the present action should have been
brought for that purpose and with that theory in view. The evi-
dent object of the petition is to have an account taken as to those
matters which were in reality outside and independent of the sale,
although apparently embraced within its terms.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to the
bourt below to have an account taken in conformity with this
opinion, and in thus taking the account the defendant is to be
treated in all respects as a trustee.
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ADM31IRALTY.
-Navigability of aters.-The navigability of a stream, for the pur-
pose of bringing it within the terms " navigable waters of the United
States," does not depend upon the mode by which commerce is con-
ducted upon it, as whether by steamers, or sailing.vessels, or Durham
boats, nor upon the difficulties attending navigation; such as those
made by falls, rapids and sand-bars, even though these be so great as
that while they last they prevent the use of the best means, such as
steamboats, for carrying on commerce. It depends upon the fact
whether the river in its natural state is such as that it affords a channel
for useful commerce: The Aontello, 20 Wall.
These doctrines applied to the Fox river, in Wisconsin, a river whose
navigability was originally so much embarrassed by rocks, rapids, &c., as
that only Durham boats could use the stream, but which afterwards, by
canals, locks and other artificial means, was so much improved as that
steamboats could use it freely; the river having, however, never, in its
natural state, been a channel for useful commerce : Rd.
From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in vol. 20 of his Reports.
2 From J. At. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 54 N. H. Reports.
3 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in vol. 10 of his Reports.
4 From lon. 0. ]St. Conover, Reporter ; to appear in 35 or 36 Wis. Reports.
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AGENT.
Implied Authority to receive Payment-Estoppel.-It is well settled
that a debtor is authorized to infer that an attorney or ageit who has
been employed to make a loan is empowered to receive both principal
and interest from his having possession of the bond and mortgage given
for the loan, or of the bond only. But the inference in such eases is
founded on the custody of the securities, and it ceases whenever they
are withdrawn by the creditor., and it is incumbent on the debtor who
makes payment to the attorney or agent, relying on such inference, to
show that the securities were in his possession on each occasion when
the payments were made: James v. Pohlmanu et al., 10 C. E. Green.
Payments made to an agent on account of principal and interest of a
bond allowed the debtor, the action of 'the creditor estopping him from
denying the agency and relieving the debtor from seeing to it that
the agent had possession of the securities when the payments were
made: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Preference-Divesting of valid Lien.-A valid lien is not divested by
the mere fact of the holder of it subsequently taking a transfer of the
equity of redemption, made to him with a view of giving to him a pre-
ference, and in violation of the Bankrupt Act. The transfer of the
equity of redemption of course is void: Avery v. ilackley, 20 Wall.
COLLATERAL SECURITY.
Sale of Cboaterals is Payment pro tanto-Injunction against Suit on
the Debt will not be granted.-That a plaintiff in a suit at law to recover
moneys due upon certain notes and checks, has assigned for full value a
mortgage given to him by the defendant in that suit, and intended as
collateral security merely, furnishes no ground for injunction to restrain
the suit. The assignment is a payment pro tanto, of which the defendant
might avail himself in the suit at law: Hewitt v. Kuhl, 10 0. E. Green.
To maintain an equitable offset, the party seeking the benefit of it must
show some equitable ground for being protected against his adversary's
demand. The mere existence of a counter demand is not enough. Nor
'will the mere pendency of an account, out of which a cross-demand may
arise, confer the right to an equitable offset : Id.
CONSIDERATION. See Deed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Se6 Intoxicating Liquors.
Right to remove Causes to Federal Court-Prevention by State
Statute- Waive.-The Constitution of the United States secures to
citizens of another state than that in which suit is brought an absolute
right to remove their cases into the Federal court, upon compliance with
the terms of the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act: Insurance Com-
pany v. Morse, 20 Wall.
The obstruction to this right imposed by a statute of a state, which
enacts: "That any fire insurance company, association or partnership in-
corporated by or organized under the laws of any Qther state of the United
States, desiring to transact any such business as aforesaid by any agent
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or agents in this state, shall first appoint an attorney in this state on
whom proccs3 of law can be served, containing an agreement that such
C,,tn ,nY will not remorve the suit for trial into the United ,tates Circuit
;m't or ,eiral courts, and/file it the office of the secretafy of state a
writtra histrument, dul11 signecd and sealed, certifying such appointment,
which shall continue 7tntil another attorney be substitited," is repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States and the laws in pursuance
therctf, and is illegal and void : I1.
The agreement of the insurance company, filed in pursuance of the
act, derives no support friom a statute thus unconstitutional, and is as
void as it would be had no such statute been passed : Id.
Eminent Domin-tih Security of Possession, of LandI until Pa 1ment.-
*Where land has been taken under the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and a question is pending in a court of law as to the amount
of compensation to which the landowner is entitled, he will be protected
in his constil utional right to possession of his property until his compen-
s:ition be ascert:ained and paid or tendered to him; and the company
in whose lhvor the condemnation is made will not be permitted to take
possession of the land on tendering so much of the compensation as is
iiot in dispute, but will be restrained from so doing: hlettlcr v. The
.Easton andI Ambot,' Railroad Co , 10 C. 1G. Green.
To secure the landowner in his cofistitutional right, and at the same
time spare the company unnecessary delay, the court will, on the latter's
paying the landowner so much of the compensation as is undisputed
and the costs of the suit in this court, and paying an anmount sufficient
to cover the disputed claim, to the end that the landowner may have
the same, if adjudged by the court of law to be entitled thereto, permit
the company to take possession of the land : Id.
CONTEMIT.
.ot 'eriewable on .Appeal.-This court has no power to reverse, on
appeal, the imposition of a fine decreed by the Circuit Court for con-
tempt of it: .Nw Orleans v. The Steaniship Conzpany, 20 Wall.
CONTRACT.
Dismissal of Servant-.Ntice to terminate Contraet.-Where a person
agreed to serve in superintending a large hotel for another, at a com-
lpensation specified, either party being at liberty- to terminate the con-
tract on thirty days' notice to the other, and the person agreeing to
superintend was ejected by the other on less than thirty days' notice,
Jcld, ii, a suit for damages by the party thus ejected-the general issue
being pleaded and notice of special matter given-that the defendant
might prove that the party ejected was unfit to pcrform his duty by
reason of the use of opiates, and by reason of unsound mental condi-
tion : Lyon v. -Pollard, 20 Wall.
Where by the terms of a contract a partyis bound to give thirty days'
notice of an intention to terminate it, and having given the notice after-
wards waives it, he may in faet renew the notice, though the form of
his communication purport to insist on the notice which lie has waived;
and at the expiration of the required time the second document will
operate as a notice: P.
Though where, under a contract of hiring services, a party is bound
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to give a certain number of days' notice to terminate it, it is not termi.
nated until the full term of days has elapsed; yet where an action has
been brought for damages for a dismissal without the proper notice, a
notice of termination may be given, though the full number of days has
not expired when an actual dismissal took place; this to show that the
plaintiff had: a right now to serve but a portion of the thirty days: Id.
DAMAGES. See Replevin.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Agent; Power.
DEED. See Sale.
Construction-Partial Want or Failure of Consideration of Arote.-
In construing a deed, proof is admissible of every material Thet that will
help to identify the person or thing intended, or which will enable the
court to put themselves as near as may be in the position of the parties,
and especially of the grantor. and the court will then construe the deed
so as to give effect to that intention, when they can find enough in the
deed to identify the land: Swain v. Saltmarsh, 54 N. H.
A defendant may show that he was induced to enter into the bargain
for the purchase of land by the false and fraudulent representations of
the plaintiff as to its location and quality, in order to lay the foundation
for a claim that there was a partial want or failure of consideration of
the note given for the purchase-money of said land : Id.
DIVORCE. See Judgment.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. See Gift. -
EMINENT DOMAIN. See Constitutional Law.
EQUITABLE SET-OFF. See Collateral Security.
ESTOPPEL. See Agent; Insurance.
EVIDENCE. See Trust.
FRAUD. See Deed.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Forbearance to collect Debt due by Another-Parties to Agreement to
p,,y Debt of Another.-An averment that the defendant, in considera-
tion that the plaintiff, to whom a third person was indebted, would for-
bear to collect his debt, promised to pay it, is to be taken as referring to
forbearance to collect of the original debtor; it therefore describes a
collateral undertaking, upon which no action can be sustained without
proof of a written note or memorandum of the agreement: Lang v.
Henry, 54 N. H.
It is as much a violation of the Statute of Frauds to prove by parol
testimony an essential part as the whole of an agreement, of which the
statute requires a note or memorandum in writing: Id.
The rule of law which authorizes the maintenance of an action upon
a verbal promise to pay the debt of another, made upon a new and inde-
pendent consideration, moving between the plaintiff and the defendant,
for the purpose of conferring a benefit, not upon the original debtor, but
upon the promissor, considered, and held inapplicable to the existing
facts : Id.
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A promise to pay the workmen in a shop, made as a part of the con-
sideration for the purchase of the stock in the shop fron the original
debtor, which does not name the workmen, or mention the sum due to
each, or the gross sum due to all of them, though not invalid because
the consideration moves wholly from the original debtor, i" subsequently
assented to by the workmen, is insufficient to entitle them to recover
the respective sums due them : 1H.
GIFT.
Donatio forris Catisa-Reqntisfes of-Evidence.-To constitute a valid
gift caust mortis, three attributes must exist: 1. The gift must be made
in contemplation of the donor's death. 2. It must be subject to the
condition that it shall take effect only upon the donor's death by his
then existing illness. 3. There must be a delivery of the subject of the
donation : Kenstons v. SCeva, Adm'r, 54 N. 1.
No particular form of words is necessary to give effect to the transac-
tion, if the evidence of that which was said and done establishes the
requisitions for its validity: 1.
Money and a negotiable promissory note may be the subjects of a gift
CauLsa mortis Id.
The statute requires that the dclivei of the gift shall be proved by
two indifferent witnesses; but the proof of the other attributes of the
gift is not defined nor limited by the statute : Mi.
The admission of the intestate that he had delivered the property, is
competent evidence upou the question of its delivery : 1d.
A valid donatio causa 2fortls may be created by a deed: _ .
And it would seem a deed may in some cases be a proper and suffi-
cient substitute for manual delivery: 11.
GROWING PLANTS. See Sale.
HIGHWAY. See .egligence.
Liability of Town, for not keeping in Repair-Suden Freshet-
Notice.-A town is not liable for injuries caused by a bridge being out
of' repair, if it became so suddenly and unexpectedly by reason of a
freshet in the stream over which it was built, and sufficient time had not
elapsed before the accident to enable the town authorities either to
repair the bridge or guard travellers against the danger : Ja uish v. The
Town of Ithaca, 35 or 36 Wis.
Notice to the chairman of the town board of supervisors (or, it seems,
to any member of that board), of a defect in a bridge in such town, is
notice to the town; and if thereafter no proper precautions are taken in
due time to guard against accidents by reasou of such defiect, the town
is chargeable with negligence: Md.
There being evidence tending to prove that the town authorities had
notice of the defect in the bridge here in question, before plaintiff at-
tempted to pass over it, and there being also conflicting evidence as to
contributory negligence on plaintiff's part, and the court having sub-
initted that question of fact to the jury, after giving the instructions
desired by the defendant, this court cannot disturb the verdict, which
was for the plaintiff: d.
H-USBAND AND WIFE.
Action by iarried Iloman-Assignment of Chose in Action by Hus-
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band to 1i7fe.-Every action in the courts of this state must be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest, with certain exceptions
mentioned in the statute: R. S., ch. 122, sect. 12 : Capentcr v. !Tatro,
35 or 36 Wis.
Under our statute (R. S., ch. 95), a married woman nay acquire the
legal title to a chose in action or other property transferred to her by
her husband, if'purchased with funds fromi her own separate estate; but
if she has no separate estate, the assignment and transfer by him to her
of a chose in action does not vest in her the legal title : I.
Where a married woman brings suit to enforce a chose in action
alleged to have been assigned to her by her husband, proof of such ail
assignment is inadmissible without proof that she had a separate estate
out of which the consideration for such assignment was paid: d.
This action is for necessaries furnished by plaintiff's husband to de-
fendant's son, about ten years old; and it is alleged that the boy was
driven from home by defendant's cruel treatment, and that the account
sued on was assigned to plaintiff by her husband. There being no proof
that plaintiff had a separate estate, out of which the account sued on
was purchased of the husband, a judgment in her favor is reversed : Id.
Refusal of Wife to join in Conveyence of Land-8Specific Peforn.
ance.-Where a wife refuses to join in a conveyance of the lands which
her husband has sold, and there is no proof' of fraud on the part of the
husband in her refusal, the court will not compel the husband to pro-
cure a conveyance or release by her, or require him to furnish an in-
demnity against her dower: Reilly v. Smith and wife, 10 C. E. Green.
Specific performance in such case refused, and the purchaser lcft to
his remedy at law, it not appearing that he was willing to pay the full
balance of the purchase-money and accept a deed from the vendor
alone : Id.
INSURANCE.
Waiver of Condition-A,hlitional Tnsurance.-A breach by the in-
sured of a condition in the policy of insurance against fire, which by
the terms of the policy would render it void, may be waived by the in-
surer: Webster v. Phxlaix Ins. Co., 35 or 36 Wis.
Action on a policy of insurance against fire. Defence, that the in-
sured, between the issue of such policy and the loss, had taken addi-
tional insurance on the property in another company, without defend-
ant's knowledge or consent, which, by the terms of the policy, would
render it void. There was conflicting evidence as to whether defend-
ant's agent knew of and consented to the additional insurance, before
the loss; but it appeared that after the loss defendant was infbrmcd by
tle agent of such additional insurance, and, without notifying plaintiff
of any refusal to pay on that ground, required her to furnish plans and
specifications of the building destroyed, which she procured and fur-
nished at considerable expense. Held, that defendant is estopped from
setting up the defence above stated : I.
The fact that the insured was required by another company to furnish
such plans and specifications, each company acting independently of the
other; or even the fact (if that were shown) that the two companies
made the requirementjointly, would not affect the force of the estop-
pel : Id
Conditions- Warranty--Misrepresentations-Acts of Agent-Entirety
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of Conuract.-In contracts of insurance against fire, stipulations of the
assured as to matters existing prior to the loss, and which afect the I'isk
itself (including stipulations as to the owine'slIj) q'th ln9Pertfy), are
more .-trictly enbrced in flivor of the insurer than those which relate to
the mode in which a loss, after it has occurred, is to be established,
adjusted and recovered : 11ninan v. .lart/brd Fire Ins. Co., 35 or 36
Wis.
The policy here sued on makes special reference to the application of
the as.-ured, as " his warranty" and a part of such poliey, and it pro-
vides that if' the assured, in his application, makes any erroneous repre-
sentations, or omits to make known any fiact material to the risk, or if lie
is not the sole and uncondition:l owner of the property insured, or (if
said property be a building) of the land on which such building stands,
by a sole, unconditional and entire ownership and title, and [it] is not
so expressed in the written portion of the policy," then the policy shall
be void : Ield. that the rights of the partics to this contract must be
determined by the general rules of law applicable to the construction
and cinforcenient of' all written agreements : Id.
In the written application of the assured in this case, lie stated, in
answer to direct interrogatories, that the property (a hopl-house and con-
tents) was not mortgaged, and that he was the sole and undisputed
owner thereof; and in answer to the question whether he owned the
ground ol which the building stood, and it not, how it was held, lie said,
By contract " It appears that the building was a part of the realty;
that his only title to the land was by virtue of a contract for the sale
and purchase of' it, entered into about five and a half' Years bet're, by
the terms of which he was to pay nearly $1600 in five annual instal-
ments, and all taxes accruing, and was to hold the land as tenant by
sufferance of the other party, "subject to be removed as a tenant hold-
ing over," whenever default should be made in the payment of any of
said instalinents; and there was a further provision that on his failure
to make any paynient of purchase-money as specified, the agreement
should be utterly void and all payments forfeited, at the option of the
vendor. When the application and policy were made, the assured had
paid only $200 of the purchase-money, and was in default of the
remainder with interest: lhl, 1. That knowledge of the true character
of the interest of the assured in the property was material to the insurer
in ascertaining the nature (if the risk. 2. That the aforesaid answers,
taken together, were equivalent to a statement that although the assured
held the land and building under a contract of purchaise, yet no person
other than himself had any substantial interest in them ; that lie
had fully paid fur the land, and was the real owner by an equitable
title in fee, with the right to enforce a conveyance to himself of the legal
title; and such misrepresentation rendered the poliey void : Rd.
At the time of the application there were also outstanding certificates
of the sale of the land fbr taxes for three successive years. Without
determining the effect of these upon the contract of insurance in this
case, the court intimates that when real estate proposed to be insured is
encumbered by unpaid taxes or certificates of tax sales, if the terms of
the contract of insurance required the assured to disclose the particulars
of his title, the safe course will be for him to state in his applicaiion all
the ficts relating thereto : Id.
The :sured testifies that when he applied for the insurance, the local
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agent of the insurer asked him who built the hop-house, and on being
told that the witness built it, replied, " Then you own the property, and
have the right to get it insured." The uncontradicted testimony of the
agent was, that lie had no knowledge whatever that there was any
encumbrance on the property: Held, that there was nothing in the evi-
dence to show that the agent, with knowledge that the assured had not
paid the purchase-money for the land, advised him that he could safely
declare and warrant that he was the sole and undisputed owner of the
building; and the assured must be held to have made that statement on
his own responsibility: Id.
Personal property in said building, which was covered by the policy,
and of which the assured was sole and absolute owner, was also
destroyed by fire: Held, that plaintiff could not recover the value
of such personal property, the contract of insurance being entire : .id.
INTEREST. See Legacy.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Constitutionality of Law relating to Damages by Sale of.-The Act
of July 2d 1870, which provides that the person who sells or furnishes
to another intoxicating liquor in violation of law, shall be liable, in cer-
tain cases where death results, to any person dependent on the deceased
for support, for all damage or loss occasioned by such injury, held con-
stitutional: Bedore v. Newton, 54 N. H.
The widow of the deceased, who was dependent on him for support,
may maintain an action for damages under this statute : Id.
JUDGMENT.
Collus've Decree of Divorce binding on Parties-Judgment of Another
State-How far conclusve.-A party to a collusive divorce is bound by
it, and cannot, upon suit for divorce in this state, take advantage of the
fraud and illegality of the proceedings upon which such decree was
based: Nichols v. .Xichols, 10 C. E. Green.
The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in any state in the
Union is equally conclusive upon the parties in all the other states as in
the state in which it was rendered. This, however, is subject to two
qualifications : 1. If it appear by the record that the defendant was not
served with process, and did not appear in person or by attorney, such
judgment is void; and 2. If it appear by the record that defendant
appeared by attorney, the defendant may disprove the authority of the
attorney to appear for him : Id.
Where a decree of divorce has been -acquiesced in for several years,
and the plaintiff has again been married, the court will not disturb the
decree for the purpose of giving alimony. Such intervention should
be based on public policy; but no such reason should suffice where,
after the acquiescence of both parties in the decree for four years, an
innocent person has been involved by marriage, and the opening of the
decree would involve her in distress, and perhaps disgrace : Id.
LEGACY.
Charged upon Land.-Land charged with the -payment of legacies
and interest thereon, when the testator clearly intended that the charge
should be a continuing and subsisting security for the payment thereof,
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cannot be relieved from such charge by the payment by the devisee of
the full aniout of the legacies to the executors : (rode v. T an alen,
10 C. E. Green.
The lien of a legacy charged on land cannot be divested, except by
an actual payment or release, or by a decree in a suit in which such
legatee or his personal representative is a party: 11.
Jiturest on.-A statement made by a testator, estimating the amount
of his estate with reference to his will, and the disposition of it therein
made, is inadmissible to show at what rate interest should be charged
against the estate upon a legacy under the will: Fowler and Vife v.
Coil ct it., 10 0. E. Green.
Where it is the duty of executors to separate a legacy from the estate
within a reasonable time, and to invest it with a view to accumulation
and the necessities of the support and education of the legatee, their
neglect of such duty makes them chargeable with interest at the legal
rate for the time being: Id.
7 Where a testator's whole estate was vested at his death in a certain
stock (if which he held the whole, in ascertaining the interest due upon
a pecuniary legacy given by the will. the amount of which legacy has
not been separated as it should have been from the estate, the dividends
which have been, during all the time for which interest is to be aseer-
tained, irregular and desultory, not based on the earnings of the com-
pany, and are no evidence of the income from the shares, are no guide
as to the rate of interest to be charged, but interest should in such case
be calculated at the legal rate, from time to time, during the period
required : Id.
The omission of executors to invest a legacy as intended by the tes-
tatr will not be excused by the fact that it was for the interest of the
residuary legatees that the legacy should not be separated from the
estate so long as it could be avoided : Rd.
LIFE ESTATE. See Power.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Contract.
MERGER.
Purchase of Fee by the .Mortgaee-Second Mortgagee bound to
redeenm.-It does not necessarily follow that by a mortgagee's becoming
the purchaser of the premises and taking title therefor at the sale
under the foreclosure, his mortgage is merged or extinguished in his
legal title : Parker v. Child, 10 U. E. Green.'
A purchaser (first mortgagee) at a sale under a foreclosure-suit upon
his mortgage, to which suit a second mortgagee was, by oversight, not
made a party, is entitled to require the second mortgagee to redeem in a
reasonable time, or be foreclosed : Md.
Such purchaser, as prior encumbraneer, must be redeemed not only
to the full amount due for principal and interest upon his mortgage, but
also to the full amount of the purchase-money paid by him over and
above such amount, the excess hav~ing been appropriated in payment of
claims prior to the second mortgage, and the purchaser being thereby
subrogated to the rights of the holders of those claims : Id.
The purchaser, if redeemed, must account for the rents and profits
during his occupation of the premises, and cancel a mortgage given by
him thereon, after he had received his deed: Id.
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MIORTOAGE. See Merger; Shcrff's Sale; W1iste.
Lien of Personal Decree for Deficiency -A personal decree for defi-
ciency of proceeds to pay the mortgage-debt dues not become a lien upon
the real property of the person against whom it is taken. until after the
sale, and in case a deficiency. is found to exist : Bell v. Gilmore, 10 C.
E. Green.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Acceptance of Trust-Pouiers in ,xecution.-Iunicipal corporations,
in this state, may take and hold property in trust for any purpose not
foreign to their institution, nor incompatible ,ith the objects of their
organization : Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. tI.
A town is capable of receiving by bequest and holding in trust a sum
of money, the income of which shall be invested yearly in the purchase
and use for display of United States flags: Md.
Although capable of holding such fund for the purpose designated, a
town has not the power of raising money by taxation for the purpose of
executing the trust; Id.
Where a testator bequeathed a sum of money to a town " on condition
that the same be accepted, and invested by said town so as to yield an
income of not less than six per centun per annum, which income shall
be invested yearly in ' United States flags,' to be used within the said
town on all proper occasions," with provision for a forfiture of the
legacy in case the town should omit to fulfil the condition : Held, that
the town might properly expend a reasonable porton of' the income of
the fund in the purchase and erectiou of' flag-staffs, ropes, halliards and
other necessary paraphernalia : 11.
NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Admiralty.
NEGLIGENCE. See Highway.
Highway--Obstruction-Stump.-Tn an action against a town for -n
injury alleged to have been caused by the insufficiency ora highway,
the defect alleged was, that " there was a large stump in or near the
middle of the main travelled track of said road," against which plain-
tiff's wagon struck, causing the injury complained of. Reld, that the
word "stump" must be understood as here meaning "that part of the
tree remaining in the earth after the stem or trunk is cut off" (which
is its usual signification), and that the complaint sufficiently alleges a
defect in the highway: Cremer, Adar'r, v. The Town of Portland, 35
or 36 Wis.
The complaint avers that "plaintiff's wagon struck said stump, which
threw plaintiff down upon his wagon rack, by reason of which le was
gredtly injured ; that by reason of such injury his life was and is greatly
endangered ; that ever since that time he has suffered great bodily and
mental pain; that he will be permanently crippled and injured for life;
that.ever since the time aforesaid he has been wholly unable to perform
any manual labor, and has been wholly unable to perform his necessary
duties and business by reason of said injury." Held, that these aver-
ments must be reasonably construed to mean that plaintiff will be " per-
manently crippled and injured for life" because of the injuries produced
by the insufficiency of the highway ; and there was therefore no error
in admitting evidence of such permanent injury : Id.
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Whether it was nece.s:ry to aver in the complaint that plaintiff was
lpernualkl-ly injured, before J)i"o of permaucut injury could be re-
ceived, i- licit here decided : hi.
In such actils it is only wiere the nnconh'tadicled evidence shows a
Statc of ,it fri c ni which the inferenc, is iodubitable, cither that the
highway was suflicient, or that plaintit" was guilty of contributory negli-
gentle-that tile court will be justified iu taking those questions fromn
the jury : M4.
Plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that lie was driving his team
along the highway at a slow walk, having his boys in the wagon with
him ; th:t when the wheel of his wagon struck the stunip and caused
the injuries complained of, he was holding the reins with one hand, and
with the other assting his boys to a seat; and that in doing so his at-
tention was diverted tbr a Tbw minutes from his team and from the high-
way. .lldi. that the court did not err in refusing to nonsuit the plain-
tiff, nor in charging that his testimonytended to show that when injured
lie was in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence: ..
Any want of ordinary care, however slight, on tile part of the injured
person, which contributed to the injury received on a defective highway,
will prevent a recovery : 14.
'-liht negligence" is not a slight want of ordinary care, but a want
of e.ct'toritta' care; and the law does not require such care of a
person injured by the negligence of another, as a condition precedent to
his recovery : 22 Wis. 62.5 . 29 Id. 144: A/l.
Defendant asked instructions to tile effect that plaintiff could not re-
elwer (1) if guilty of negligence (though slight) which contributed
directly to the injury, or (2) if "guilty of any negligence which con-
tributed directly or proximately to the injury." .ehl, that these in-
structions were properly refused : 1d.
POWER.
Life 7Ten,,nt-Judgment agaist-Exercise of the Power to sell and
apJ)lh Acome.-A j udgment recovered against a devisee for life, vested
under the will with power to consent that the executors should sell tile
real estate at their discretion, and appropriate the income fir the sup-
port of such devisee and his family, during the devisee's life, does not
extinguish tile power. The lien of the judgment is subject to the
power: Lrygett v. Doremuts, 10 0. E. Green.
The power to consent to a sale is not extinguished in all eases where
the donee of the power is the life tenant, even by the absolute alienation
by him of his life estate. The rule is that, so long as nothing is done in
derogation of the alienee's estate, the alienation has no operation on the
power: .'d.
When a power is executed, the person taking under it takes under
him who created the power. and not under him who executes it. The
only exceptions are where the person executing the power has granted
a lease or any other interest which ho may do by virtue of his estate,
fbr then he is not allowed to defeat his own act. But suffering a judg-
ment is not within the exception as an act done by the party; it is a
proceeding in hi-itium, and therefore falls within the rule : Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See Constitutional Law.
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REPLEVIN.
Damages-Remission of Part.-In replevin, where plaintiff elects to
take the value of the property with damages for the deteniion, the rule
of damages should be the same as in trover: Bigelow v. Doolittle, 35 or
36 Wis.
In this action of replevin, a part of the property consisted of a wagon,
,buggy and reaper; and plaintiff elected to take the value, with damages
for the detention ; and such- value was ascertained as of the time of the
taking. Held, that the daniages for the detention in this case should
be interest on the value of the property, so ascertained, from the taking
to the verdict: Id.
The jury were instructed to allow, as damages for the detention, "the
value of the use of the wagon and buggy, taking into account what part
of the year the same would be used," and the value of the use of the
reaper for the two seasons (of 1872 and 1873) which intervened between
the taking and the trial. Hehl, erroneous : L.
The excess of the damages awarded by the jury for the detention of
the property, above interest on the sum found as its value at the time
of taking, being readily determined by calculation, this court orders that
in case the plaintiff shall remit such excess and pay the costs in this
court, the judgment stand affirmed ; otherwise, that it be reversed : Id.
SALE. See Wlrarranty.
Growing Trees-Terms of Grant-Time of Removal.-When, in a
deed of growing trees to be removed by the grantee from the grantor's
land, the terms of grant, taken in their literal and usual sense, signify
an absolute conveyance of the title of the trees, the grant is not made
a conditional one by a stipulation (express or implied) as to the time of
removal: Hoit v. The Stratton Mills, 54 N. H.
If no time is expressly fixed, the construction generally is, that the
grantee has a reasonable time for removal : 1l.
If the grantee, after the expiration of such reasonable time, enters
and removes the trees which were absolutely conveyed to him by the
deed, he is liable in trespass for the entry, but not for the value of the
trees : Jil.
SET-OFF. See Collateral Security.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Adjournment- Combination of Bidders.-A refusal to adjourn a sale,
in the exercise by the sheriff of a reasonable discretion, is not sufficient
ground for setting the sale aside: Morris v. Woodward, 10 0. E. Green.
Where an agreement is made by the complainant with a mortgagee,
defendant present at the sale of mortgaged premises, and intending to
buy in the property to protect his claim, if necessary, that if the mort-
gagee would not bid, and would permit him to buy the property, he
would pay his claim; and by reason of the latter not bidding in pursu-
ance of such agreement, the property brought much less than it other-
wise would have done, thereby throwing upon the mortgagor, against
whom the complainant had taken a personal decree for deficiency, a lia-
bility for a greater deficiency, such agreement is a fraud upon the
mortgagor, which vitiates the sale : Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORM1ANCE. See Husband and Wife.
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SUBROGATION.
Equitabulc Rght- Only goes so far (is is necessary for Protection.-
The right of substitution or subrogation is a purely equitable one,
and the extent to which it will be exercised must often depend
upon eircuimstances. Whether it will be extended to the extreinest
point, so as to include all the rights of the creditor, must often depend
on whether it is necessary to the protection of the surety that it should
be so: Alatter qf Attachment aftjahlst Abram S.- Hewitt, 10 (,. E. Green.
Where a surety who was subrogated to the rights of a landowner, to
whom the forimer had been compelled to pay the debt of his principal
for land taken by the principal (a railroad company), under the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, applied to this court to enjoin the use
of the company's road over the land : 1lcM, that it was not necessary tohis protection to prevent such use, there being nothing to be gained by
him through such injunction, the company being insolvent and its affairs
in the hands of a receiver, and the road being operated for the accom-
modation of the public merely by a trustee of holders of bonds of the
company, with a view to a more advantageous sale of the property on
foreclosure : Md.
SURETY. See Subrogation.
TowN. See Highway; Nregllgence.
TRESPASS. See Sale.
TRUST. See Municipal Corporation.
Sale, of Land to pay Legacies charge(l on it-Liability of Purchaser
for Application of Purchase.monc.-A charge of all testator's debts
and funeral expenses, &c., upon all his estate, real and personal, not
otherwise specifically bequeathed, is equivalent to a trust for sale of all
the real and personal estate not otherwise specifically bequeathed, for
the purpose of paying those debts and expenses: Dewey's Executors v.
Ruggles, 10 C. E. Green.
The general rule is, that a purchaser is not bound to see to the appli-
cation of the purchase-money when the testator's debts are charged
generally upon his estate. There are exceptions to it, when there is a
breach of trust by the executors, and the purchaser is a party to it, and
where the purchase is after the institution of a suit which takes the
administration of the estate out of the hands of the trustee : Id.
Declaration of-Transfer of Possession not necessary-Parol Eidence
to axplain Dccd.-It is not necessary to a trust that there should be any
transfer of property, whether the fund be in the possession of the donor-
or of another. The property may remain as it was, and the donor may
constitute himself, as the possessor, trustee of it: Eaton v. Cook, 10 C.
E. Green.
A direction, by written instrument or by word, to a debtor by his
creditor to hold the money due in trust for a third person, such direc-
tion being communicated to the debtor, creates a trust in favor of the
donee: Id.
In construing a declaration of trust, " I hereby cancel the above
bond and give it voluntarily to J. C. and her heirs," verbal declarations
of the donor made prior to and contemporaneously with the gift, and
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relating to it, are competent evidence as to whom he meant to designate
by the words " her heirs :" Id.
VENDOR. See Hsband and Wi7fe.
WARRANTY.
Sale of Personaltyi-Recoupment for Breach.-The law is well settled
in this state, that " in case of a warranty, direct or implied, where the
article purchased proves defective or unfit for the use intended, the pur-
chaser, without returning or offering to return it, and without notifying
the vendor of the defects, may bring his action for the recovery of
damages, or, if sued for the price," may recoup damages for such breach:
Fisk v. Ydznk, 12 Wis. 302, and other cases in this court: Bonnell v.
Jacobs, 35 or 36 Wis.
Where the warranty alleged was, that a furnace sold to defendant and
put up in his dwelling-house by plaintiff, " would work efficiently, and
properly heat such dwelling-house." the jury were instructed that if
there was any defect in the furnace, it was defendant's duty to notify
plaintiff that it was defective, and that he should come and perfect it or
take it away within a reasonable time ; and that if the defendant kept
the furnace without giving such notice, he thereby waived any claim for
the defect. ield, error: Id.
WASTE.
Mortgagor not permitted to commt.-A mortgagor Will not he per-
mitted to commit waste upon the mortgaged premises to the extent of
rendering them an insufficient security for the mortgage-debt: Coggill
v. .Afillburn Land Company, 10 0. E. Green.
No authority to commit waste upon mortgaged premises will be im-
plied from the object for which the property was purchased, nor from
the price agreed to be paid: Id.
WITNESS.
Parties-Depositions-Secondary Evidence.-Under the Act of July
2d 1864, providing that in civil actions in courts of the United States
there shall be no exclusion of any witness, "because he is a party to or
interested in the issue tried;" witnesses may, other things allowing,
testify (without any order of court) by deposition. And if not satisfied
with a deposition which they have given, have a right, without order of
court, to give a second one : Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall.
The rule established by this court as to the introduction of secondary
evidence-that it must be the best which the party has it in his power
to produce-is to be so applied as to promote the ends of justice and
guard against frauds, surprise, and imposition. The court has not gone
to the length of the English adjudications, that there are no degrees in
secondary evidence. Hence, where the records of a court were all burnt
during the rebellion, what appeared to be a copy of an officially certified
copy was held properly received ; the certified copy, if any existed, not
being in the party's custody or plain control, and there being no positive
evidence that it existed, though there was evidence tending to show that
it did. There is nothing in the Act of Congress of March 3d 1871 (16
Stat. at Large 474), providing for putting in a permanent form proof
of the contents of judicial records, nor in the statute of Texas of 11th
February 1850 (Pasehall's Digest, Article 4969), on the same subject,
which changes this rule : Id.
